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Editors' Introduction
This special issue of Acta Juridicais a culmination of a series of events to
honour former Deputy Chief Justice, Dikgang Moseneke, including a
seminar at the University of the Witwatersrand. A well-attended symposium was held at the University of Cape Town on 7 December 2016, with
thoughtful presentations and engaged dialogue in honour of a great
jurisprudential mind and judicial leader. Papers presented at the symposium appear in this volume, while additional papers were included to add
to the richness of the tribute which we pay to Justice Moseneke upon his
retirement from the Bench.
The articles in this volume are arranged into three main thematic
sections: separation ofpowers, equality and economic justice. In addition
there are four personal reflections from colleagues, friends and a former
Constitutional Court clerk. These reflections remind us of the human
being behind the distinguished legal stature and role played by Justice
Moseneke.
Judicial engagement and the separation of powers occupy the first
thematic section. The doctrine of separation ofpowers received considerable attention fromlustice Moseneke. As illustrative, in National Treasury
and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others' Moseneke DCJ
warned that the primary responsibility of a court is not to decide questions
reserved for or which fall within the domain of the other branches of the
state. In respect of an application for an interim interdict to prohibit an
organ of state from proceeding with an e-tolling system for public roads,
he noted:
In a dispute as the present one, this does not mean that an organ of state
is immunised from judicial review only on account of separation of
powers. The exercise of all public power is subject to constitutional
control. In an appropriate case an interdict may be granted against it. For
instance, if the review court in due course were to find that SANRAL
acted outside the law then it is entitled to grant effective interdictory
relief That would be so because the decision of SANRAL would in effect
be contrary to the law and thus void.
When it evaluates where the balance of convenience rests, a court must
recognise that it is invited to restrain the exercise of statutory power
within the exclusive terrain of the executive or legislative branches of
government. It must assess carefully how and to what extent its interdict
will disrupt executive or legislative functions conferred by the law and
thus whether its restraining order will implicate the tenet of division of
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powers. While a court has the power to grant a restraining order of that
kind, it does not readily do so, except when a proper and strong case has
been made out for the relief and, even so, only in the dearest of cases. 2
As these dicta reveal, Justice Moseneke was particularly concerned with
finding the location of the boundary between judicial intervention and
executive policy-making. These dicta provide a foundation for the first
two papers devoted to exploring this theme. Heinz Klug examines Justice
Moseneke's jurisprudence in terms of the interaction of different spheres
of authority. Klug argues that Justice Moseneke showed sensitivity to the
need for judicial restraint, of courts invading other domains of state
authority, while still remaining alert to the need for institutional integrity
at all levels of governance. Klug points to Justice Moseneke's concern for
the development of a particular South African doctrine of separation of
powers that is sensitive to a democratic system of governance.
Klug shows howJustice Moseneke was concerned that a South African
doctrine of separation ofpowers had to recognise the will of the people as
expressed legislatively. Justice Moseneke was also mindful that effective
government can respond substantively to the deprivation of the poor and
marginalised while simultaneously ensuring the public power so exercised
was under constitutional control. With this balanced approach, Justice
Moseneke ensures that the judiciary protects itself against criticism of
overreach in exercising its authority, while recognising that the legislature
and the executive have space to fulfil their own designated constitutional
roles. Klug argues that, in this way, Justice Moseneke has made 'a
singularly important contribution' to the development of a distinctly
South African conception of separation ofpowers.
Peter Danchin critically explores the questions of constitutional
authority and normativity, and suggests that a deep and perilous paradox
arises in their interrelation in any constitutional order. Danchin suggests
that the enthusiastic embrace of a thick model of constitutional review is
predicated on an incorrect premise. Thus, within the South African
context, the legal evil ofApartheid was not parliamentary supremacyperse
but a violation of its core premises: democratic self-government and the
key principles of representation and political equality. Likewise, the
advocates of strongjudicial review have paid insufficient attention to the
potential erosion of self-government, the idea of popular sovereignty and
the danger ofjudicial displacement thereof Thus, to justify their relationship to popular sovereignty, judges will increasingly have to resort to
formalism and originalism to protect against a legitimacy deficit. This
legitimacy deficit is perceived and expressed as unelected judges fashion-

2 See n

1 at paras 64-66.
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ing the details of policy, rather than deferring to democratically elected
institutions.
This is a provocative contribution to the debate about Justice
Moseneke's deep concern to establish viable boundaries between the
judiciary and the other arms of government, particularly when viewed
against Klug's careful embrace ofJustice Moseneke's doctrine of separation of powers.
Cathleen Powell employs the ground-breaking case of Glenister v
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others3 as a means of advancing
the notion of constitutional democracy under the rule of law. Powell's
argument, drawing on the earlier work of Etienne Mureinik and Lon
Fuller, emphasises the importance of the legislature and the executive in
justifying the exercise of their power through the principles of legality.
Within this framework, the concept of inter-branch dialogue between
the judiciary and the other two arms of the state becomes central to the
constitutional model; that is the executive, in particular, is required to
explain why a specific exercise of power complies with the values of the
rule of law. This process ofjustification takes place in an exchange with
the judiciary. This dialogic process, in turn, promotes a culture of
justification of the exercise of public power. A decision of the majority in
Glenister, co-written by Justice Moseneke, illustrates how courts can
examine the design of a key institution, such as the anti-corruption unit
called the Hawks, to ensure principles of transparency, accountability and
adherence to legality are central to the exercise of the powers of the
particular institution. Read thus, this paper offers a counter-narrative to
that developed by Danchin.
Ntombizozuko Dyani-Mhango and Mtende Mhango advance an
argument for the creation of a South African political question doctrine
which is borne out of a separation of powers principle. Using Justice
Moseneke's majority opinion in InternationalTradeAdministration Com mission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd4 and National Treasury and Others v
Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others,5 they argue that while
Justice Moseneke's jurisprudence recognises the limits ofjudicial power,
it fails to define the scope and contours ofjudicial authority.
The key point made here is thatJustice Moseneke has failed to develop,
as presumably is the case with the rest of the Court, a coherent political
question doctrine which is essential to the principle of separation of
powers. The authors contend that the political question doctrine is not
one that requires courts to refrain from deciding the question that has
political implications, but rather applies to political questions that are
32011 (3) SA347 (CC).
4 2012 (4) SA 618 (CC).
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either delegated to decision by the political branches of government for
resolution, or those where there is an absence of a judicial norm or
standard to resolve the problem.
Dyani-Mhango and Mhango's main complaint seems to be thatjudicial
pronouncements regarding the separation of powers doctrine have left
out crucial considerations as to how the courts should observe the limits
of their own power. Whether such precision of implementation of the
doctrine can be offered by the adoption of the US political question
doctrine is debatable and is certainly questioned by Klug in his chapter.
But what is interesting with regard to these insights is the failure of the
other institutions which exist to promote accountability, namely the
Hawks, the National Prosecuting Authority, the South African Police
Service, and Parliament with its residual powers, to hold the executive
accountable.
The second thematic area which draws on the judgment of Justice
Moseneke concerns the vindication of equality principles enshrined in
the Constitution, which have been described in this volume as 'transformation, equality and indigeneity'. Chuma Himonga commences with the
view that the Constitutional Court has endorsed legal pluralism by
affording equal status to indigenous law and common law, thereby
contributing to the decolonisation of the law.
Himonga then provides a useful analysis by which to test the decolonisation of law, namely the inclusion of all legal systems in the national legal
system. She is concerned with the existence of the conditions necessary
for the application and development of all legal systems which comprise
the totality of the national legal system and particularly the attention
which must be given to the determination of authenticity of unwritten
indigenous systems of law applied by the courts. Although she finds that a
number ofjudgments of the Constitutional Court have contributed to the
decolonisation of law, there are pronouncements of the Court which
have cast a shadow over the relationship between indigenous law and the
common law by the programme given to common law. Developing upon
this theme, Himonga raises the question as to how customary law is to be
6
part of the 'amalgam of law for a future South Africa'. It is the challenge
to ensure that customary law is not dominated by the common law, as was
the case under the colonial legal system, which lies at the heart of this
contribution.
By contrast, Sandra Fredynan steers the issue of vulnerability in a
different direction to that of previously disadvantaged persons and the
hierarchical nature of affirmative action jurisprudence. Fredman is particularly concerned with the relationship between race, class, representa6 Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) at
para 51.
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tion and the principle of substantive equality. She poses the following key
question: what role does affirmative action play in cases where socioeconomic disadvantage is no longer an issue? Developing upon Justice
Moseneke's conception of the restitutionary aim of substantive equality as
set out, in particular, in South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard,7
Fredman extends the conversation with regard to affirmative action
beyond that of socio-economic disadvantage to the addressing of ongoing stereotyping and prejudice which, in turn, must facilitate voice,
participation and structural change. In this way, she contends that the
jurisprudence developed by Justice Moseneke can be expanded to ensure
that all members of a status class are not treated as identically positioned
economically and socially, a consideration which can reinforce internal
differences within groups and further marginalise the weakest in the
group. Accordingly Fredman argues that affirmative action, while not
ignoring socio-economic disadvantage, should avoid collapsing status
into class. In this way, the promotion of a jurisprudence of substantive
equality can be based upon a more nuanced analysis of the power relations
and the different aspects of an individual's social position.
Fredman, however, reminds us that affirmative action must be seen as
part of a broad-based radical strategy of redistribution and restitution.
Coming to this conclusion, she recalls Justice Moseneke's comment in
South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard:8 'We must remind
ourselves that restitution measures, important as they are, cannot do all
the work to advance social equity.'
In a similar theme, Lauren Kohn and Raisa Cachalia critically reflect on
the decision in MinisterofJustice and ConstitutionalDevelopment and Others v
South African Restructuring and Insolvency PractitionersAssociation and Others.9
They show how the s 9(2) restitutionary measures, laid out earlier by
Justice Moseneke in Minister of Finance v Van Heerden,10 influenced the
SARIPAjudgment. This is so in particular regarding the negotiation to go
beyond a mechanical system for historical restitution, to an equality
jurisprudence that addresses the legacy of the racism ofthe past as it forges
a path towards a non-racist future.
In her contribution, Tendayi Achiume juxtaposes Justice Moseneke's
judgment in Barnardwith the decision of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others
v Republic of Zimbabwe." Situating Barnard in the anti-subordination
tradition, she uses the comparison between Barnard and Campbell to
2014 (6) SA 123 (CC).
See n 7 at para 33.
92017 (3) SA95 (SCA).
10 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC).
n [2008] SADCT 2 (28 November 2008).
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underscore the vital role of judges in the quest for substantive racial
equality in southern Africa. DescribingJustice Moseneke's jurisprudential
approach as transformative, Achiume sees his vision and commitment as
vital to attaining the goals of substantive racial equality. She laments the
missed opportunity on the part of the SADC Tribunal in Campbell for
forging a similar path as that shaped by Justice Moseneke. She particularly
regrets the rejection of historical racial discrimination in the Campbell
judgment as well as its lack of 'doctrinal nuance'.
Economic justice is the final thematic theme in this volume. judge
Fayeeza Kathree-Setiloane invites the reader to appreciate justice
Moseneke's unique insight and vision of the transformative project of the
Constitution. She observes that the constitutional project has failed to
transform the socio-economic plight of the majority of South Africans; a
failure which is not due to an inadequate Constitution, but rather to a
failure ofpolitical will.
In her contribution Erika George raises the interesting question of the
relationship between economic change and the rule of law in effecting
such change. She argues that a fitting tribute to Justice Moseneke's
commitment to the belief that all people are entitled to live in a just
society where their dignity and self-worth are respected would be an
inclusive vision of economic development and public participation in
economic policy-making. She shows luminously how in a range of areas
from equality to eviction, and thus the provision of alternative accommodation to the law of contract, Justice Moseneke has sought to effect
substantive transformation upon the legal system in crder to achieve
economic justice for all.
. Erika George draws attention to Justice Moseneke's calls to engage
with international economic law in a manner that brings about economic
justice for South Africans. George acceptsJustice Moseneke's invitation to
imagine a transformative South African constitutionalism which contains
an inclusive vision of economic development and public participation in
economic policy-making. To this end she examines a series of problems
relating to bilateral investment treaties and the manner in which these
agreements provide a trump card for investors over the rights contained in
the South African Constitution. In turn this leads George to a discussion
of the development of a set of obligations which should be imposed upon
global business enterprises not only to provide redress for human rights
abuses occasioned by their business operations but also to ensure the
promotion of economic development. George finds precedent in the
litigation between the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South
13
Africa12 and the Treatment Action Campaign, concerning the former's
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argument that the South African government's legislative programme to
protect the health of the public by making essential medicines more
affordable was in breach of the government's TRIPS obligation. She
considers this to be an exemplar of the manner in which law can be used
in a more global context for the promotion of economic development
and the protection against human rights abuses by powerful private
interests, being multinational corporations. This article raises fascinating
questions about the role of the Constitution in the shaping of the content
of economic policy for the promotion of developmental objectives.
Jaco Barnard-Naud6 examines the critical role played by Justice
Moseneke in the emergence of good faith as a master signifier for the
general principles of South African contract law. Borrowing from the
work ofJacques Lacan, Barnard-Naud6 argues that contract law in South
Africa is in the process of significant change away from traditional
signifiers such as will theory reliance, misrepresentation, breach, duress
and public policy, all of which have fallen under ajudicial master signiffier
of freedom of contract, or pacta sunt servanda. It is through this master
signifier that the individualistic legal subject of the law of contract is
juridically represented. Barnard-Naud6 shows how Justice Moseneke's
minority judgment in Barkhuizen v Napier,14 in particular, acknowledges
the role for good faith in the law of contract so that this judgment
represents the planting of the roots for an emergent new master signifier
in our law of contract. In particular, Barnard-Naud6 finds the following
passage injustice Moseneke's judgment in Barkhuizen to be significant:
To defeat a complaint that a contractual term offends public policy by
holding that the complainant has not shown individual unfairness is in
effect to extol the laissez faire notions of freedom of contract at the
expense of public notions of reasonableness and fairness. 1 5
This constitutes a distinctive judicial displacement of freedom of
contract with principles of good faith and fairness. Viewed within this
prism, the jurisprudence ofJustice Moseneke poses a fundamental challenge to the manner in which the law of contract is adjudicated upon,
analysed in the traditional textbooks and taught at universities.
Barnard-Naud6 contends therefore that Moseneke's judgments in
Evefresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd1 6 and
Barkhuizen have opened the door to a more caring, egalitarian, humane
and ultimately morejust contractual discourse.
This issue concludes with personal reflections written by inspirational
colleagues that provide a picture of the man behind the outstandingjurist.
13 2002 (5) SA721 (CC).
14 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC).
15 See n 14 at para 104.

16 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC).
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Coming from the pens of such distinguished judges as Kate O'Regan,
MS Navsa and Albie Sachs, as well as academic and former constitutional
clerk, Sindiso Mnisi Weeks, they provide penetrating personal insights.
into the jurist whose contribution to legal life this issue celebrates.
Penelope Andrews
Dennis Davis
Tabeth Masengu
November 2017

